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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In December, 1970, the British Museum put on show a
large selection of bronzes from the city of Benin, Nigeria.
Shortly after the opening Mr. Chukwuma Osugi, General Sec-
retary of the All Africa Students and Workers Union, publicly
asked Lord Eccles, British Minister for the Arts, "to instruct
the British Museum to explain when and how they acquired the
bronzes, now worth a fortune to western collectors." I have
written the following paper in answer to Mr. Osugi' s request.
Mr. Osugi reminded us of an historical truism: the least
predictable outcome of an historical event frequently proves
to be of the greatest historical consequence. The British
expedition into what later became Nigeria, which confiscated
the bronzes for the British Museum, had as its goal the exten-
sion of rule into the Nigerian hinterland, and the punishment
of a recalcitrant native monarch. Both these results were
readily accomplished, and so the matter might have ended, were
it not for the fact that the two leaders of the expedition, Sir
Harry Rawson, and Sir Ralph Moor, ordered the removal of all
the native art work. The results of that action are only
beginning to be explored, whereas those of the former were
readily accessible and have now been thoroughly examined by
British and African historians. The reason for the failure to
perceive the significance of the action at the time, and for
the next seventy years, lies in the attitude of mind which
>
2the British had toward their imperial victims, and it is the
dimensions of this attitude which I hope to make clear.
Earlier empire historians who failed to take account of
the moral implications of empire are rapidly being supplanted by
those who approach the subject of expansion from the native
point of view. But the earlier pro-British viewpoint is
interesting precisely because it lacks the moral imperative
so obvious to us today and thereby mirrors more precisely the
state of the imperial mind at its zenith. Work from the native
point of view has, thus far, taken the real motives for expans-
ion, as opposed to the professed ones, as the jumping off place
and thus tended to see native attitudes and actions, perhaps
correctly, in terms of response. It should be possible to
pinpoint incidents in which the imperial power and the native
culture confront each other in some sense in their fullness.
If one is willing to allow the artifacts of a culture some role
in the culture, then the Benin Expedition of 1897 is such an
historical incident. No one person from the kingdom of Benin
could speak as eloquently for the culture as could those ancient
and beautiful bronze heads.
Already when the British mounted their expedition against
Benin the British intellectual world was becoming sensitive to
the destruction which followed in the wake of the imperial advance.
An interest in primitive culture, however, thriving in England
since the founding of the ethnological societies in the 1840' s,
was still limited to the preservation of what was rapidly
being destroyed in order to satisfy the curiosity of the destroyers
3It had nothing to do with justice or injustice. Sir Harry
Rawson, for example, recognized that bronzes found in the city
might be of historic interest to the British Museum, and after
the expedition the government was criticized for not sending
along an anthropologist who could catch a glimpse of the culture
before the inevitable destruction. No voice was raised in
defense of leaving the objects where they were.
Anthropologists, who did begin to play a part in imperial
administration after political boundaries had been fixed, were
the first to real ize that imperially imposed political struct-
ures were not adequate to deal with African tribal structure.
For the historian Benin did not become extricated from the
history of the Niger Coast Proct ectorate until Chief Egharevba
wrote a general history in 1930. He managed to put down the
oral traditions of the Bini while those elders of the tribe,
who had matured before the coming of the British were still
alive and could tell him. Earlier, in the 1920' s, the bronzes,
along with other works, aroused general enthusiasm for "primitive
art", and have subsequently received a fair share of critical
attention, but the Benin history project in 1957 was the first
attempt to deal with the history of Benin as a whole. This
project, under the direction of Professor Onwuke Dike ther of
the University of Ibadan, included an historian, an art histor-
ian, and an anthropologist. It was an interdisciplinary attempt
to deal with the problem of writing the history of illiterate
peoples. All three members of the team have now published books
about Benin, helping to unfold the complexities of the culture
before and during the early advent of the Europeans, to explain
the role which the now famous bronzes have played in the life
of the city and its inhabitants, and to document the irrevers-
ible changes wrought by the British take-over in 1897. Alan
Ryder, the historian, decided to divide Bini history at 1897
with good reason. After the expedition the conquerors imposed
a form of government upon the inhabitants of the city comprehen-
sible to the British but foreign to the Binis; and removed
from the city most if not all of the art which had played an
integral role in the life of the culture.
Two points should be advanced concerning the removal of
the art. In the first place the arrival of the objects in
England occassioned a flurry in intellectual circles then
attempting to come to terms with the "culture" of the non-
western world. Not that the objects from Benin directly in-
fluenced a change in the appreciation of "primitive" art -
that is a phenomenon of the 20 ' s - but Benin objects flooded
the market momentarily in 1897 and those interested in West
Africa were obliged to take a stand on them. Charles Read,
the curator of the Ethnological department of the British
Museum in 1897 and the first non-policital or military figure
to see the bronzes when they arrived in England, concluded
finally, after discovering the intricate method which had been
used in casting the pieces, that they had been made by wander-
ing Egyptians. His technical assistant, who analyzed the content
of the bronzes, believed that they had been made by Portuguese
5sailors on board ship off the coast of Benin. Even Mary
Kingsley who knew more about West Africa in 1897 than most
people, suggested that some of the pieces were probably made
in Birmingham to be used as trading items. In short, a theoret-
ical framework for appreciating the objects in a way which we
consider intelligent today was missing in 1897. Why then, did
the British bother to take them?
Secondly, in a most interesting way the bronzes serve as
a focal point for bringing together two facets of imperial
history, that of political conquest and cultural contact. My
intentions here are not ambitious enough to deal directly with
either of these vast areas in terms of Benin. But an interest
*
in the when and the how, as Mr. Osugi phrased it, two aspects
of the Benin expedition thus far overlooked by imperial histor-
ians who write either from the British or the African point of
view, and art historians who are presently interested in under-
standing the pieces themselves, as well as a general interest
in exploitation, led me to wonder why those involved in the
punitive expedition decided to remove the pieces, how they went
about doing it, and what they did with the pieces when they got
them home. Chapter Five discloses how the British shipped them
out and what they did with them, an event relatively easy to
trace. The why of this tragic episode I felt could only be
understood by attempting to understand the whole short history
of the Niger Coast Protectorate, an area which never occupied
the full attention of the Foreign Office, under whose jurisdiction
it lay until after 1897, and which only came into public view
6when the punitive expedition was mounted against Benin. The
British meant by the Benin expedition to teach a lesson, not
to the Binis but to all those under the yoke of empire, on
the effects of failure to cooperate. The failure of the
British even to recognize what they were doing in Benin can
only sadden the reader today.
I have taken the story up to the point where some two
hundred of the bronzes became the official property of the
British Museum. Protectorate officials disposed of some of
the loot privately, and Foreign Office officials of the rest.
I have not attempted here to deal with the development of an
aesthetic regarding primitive art and the role played by
Benin, nor with to me • the more interesting question of discover-
ing, if it is still possible, what the Bini reaction to the
removal of the bronzes was. I do not deny my bias. I pursued
the subject enraged against the British, yet such changes as
occurred in Benin seem to be part of the fabric of history.
Their inevitability, especially in the modern world, only makes
them the more tragic.
Since the days when slaves bearing the conquered treasure
of the Mediterranean world marched behind triumphal Roman
Legions in parade looting has been a constituent part of empire.
What foot soldiers grabbed in the heat of battle pro-consuls
distributed at home if the objects seemed to have either great
beauty or great value. The conquerors rationalized such activity
with codes and regulations, but to those looted general and
7soldier were equally thief. The right of booty has been a
traditional part of war throughout history. To the victor
belong the spoils, human slaves, gold, food, objects of
beauty. But by the end of the 19th century the British
explained their imperial activities to themselves not in
terms of conquest but of a civilizing mission. For military
activities carried on within this framework there should have
been a transformation in the ancient custom of taking booty.
In light of their self justification their continued looting
was totally improper. I hoped to express the irony inherent
in their activity by employing the term imperial looting to
describe the activity in Benin.
8II
In the beginning of 1897 the Benin kingdom was an obscure
and relatively unexplored part of the interior of the Niger
Coast Protectorate. It constituted an area of approximately
4,000 square miles not yet under the sway of either direct
British administration or trade, but claimed by the British
as part of their sphere of influence following the Berlin West
Africa conference of 1885. To strengthen the claim the British
signed a treaty with the king in 1892. Had it not been for the
activities of a rather obscure young career officer, son of an
Anglican clergyman and graduate of Cambridge named James R.
Phillips, the Protectorate might have remained unknown to the
British public. But Phillips, by his death at the hands of
natives from Benin after a hastily prepared and ill-thought out
expedition to the city, occasioned a massive retaliatory effort
against King Overami which resulted in his exile and the establish
ment of British rule. The British also removed the bronzes, for
which the city is now famous. Conveniently, officials of the
Foreign Office, as well as earlier his torians ^"of Nigeria, saw
the conquest of Benin as a response to the murder of Phillips.
Yet policy had dictated for a long time that the king would
have to be deposed. Had it not been for Phillips, however, the
expedition would have been much smaller, and might not have ended
in the total destruction of the city and the consequent looting.
The removal of an estimated 2500 art objects and artifacts can
in no way be seen as a premeditated act. It was, rather, a
thoughtless act, committed with no awareness of consequences,
no consciousness of guilt. Rather it resulted from the general
British ignorance of Africa - its polity,
. its religion, and
from the prevalent European belief in cultural evolution which
provided the non-scientific mind with a confident belief in
the superiority of the white race.
The King, or Oba, of Benin, before his exile in September,
1897, could trace his lineage back at least to the 14th century/
He lived with his court in a separate part of the city, roughly
in the middle of his kingdom, and he ruled a vast empire with
boundaries as a modern anthropologist terms them, "continually
expanding and contracting as new conquests were made and as
vassals on the borders rebelled and were reconquered'.' Kings
from the time of Eweku I, about 1200 A.D., exacted tribute from
the settlements in their empire and were both temporal and
spiritual leaders of their people. They, in turn, recognized
the spiritual authority of the Oni of Ife, to the west of Benin
the city from which legend says that the Binis originally came
4
and from which they learned how to cast bronze.
The city had been known to European traders since the 15th
century when the Portuguese initiated trade with the west coast
Africans and natives of Benin; several published travellers'
accounts were available in the 1890 's in English, by Portuguese
Dutch, French, and early British travellers and traders. But
since the abolition of the slave trade the area had been of
little interest to the British. Since 1892 no Protectorate
official had visited the city. A Londoner with an interest
10
in Africa would hardly have singled out Benin, even though
there was a relatively large literature about it. 5 The early
accounts interested administrators primarily because of the
geographic knowledge they could provide, but to the armchair
anthropologist of the time there were enough theoretical works
like Edward Tylor's Primitive Culture available to limit the
usefulness of such musty travelers' records. While most of
the officials who wrote about Benin—Sir Richard Burton at an
earlier period, Sir Claude Macdonald, the first Consul General,
and Captain L. H. Gallwey, the first vice-consul to the Benin
district of the Protectorate—were familiar with earlv accounts,
a noted expert on Africa, whose first book on West Africa came
out in January, 1897, Miss Mary Kingsley, knew little of Benin.
And she claimed to have spent fifteen years reading up on every-
thing available before actually going into the field. For the
British public in general Benin was merely a part of the hinter-
land of the Niger Coast Protectorate.
Even the Protectorate hardly enjoyed extensive press cover-
age. When Macdonald was chosen Consul-General in 1891 the Times
simply identified the area as "one of the most trying regions in
Africa."' 7 Lord Salisbury, theForeign Secretary under whom the
major decisions affecting the Protectorate were made, thought
o
of the whole Niger area as a "malarious African desert". Africa
in general held a certain fascination for him, and at one point
he surrounded himself with maps of the areas into which the
imperial arm was reaching.
9 But West Africa was a rather un-
attractive pawn to be played off in the larger game of controll-
ing the Sudan. 10 A momentary flurry of interest bristled in
11
Parliament and the press when in 1895 the men of Brass, a city
in the Protectorate, had attacked the adjoining lands of Sir
George Goldie's Royal Niger Company, killing several people.
They shocked the British public because they ceremoniously
ate their victims, but after a few days public attention
waned, and neither the Times nor the Manchester Guardian made
any attempt to supply background information.
The interest in Benin in 1897 owed much to the fact that
the British had no doubt about their innocence and the guilt"
of the natives. To them it seemed clear that savage natives
had massacred innocent British officials. Here was justification
for pseudo-scientific theories and racial opinions, as well as
proof of heroism. The massacre appealed to the popular imperial-
ist mind as well as to the more scientifically interested, and
the "Little Englander" could not complain about imperial spend-
ing."'""'" Also, Benin itself was fascinating for its lurid and
spectacular past. Sir Richard Burton, famed British explorer,
had been to the city in 1863 and had written, "The place has a
12fume of blood, it stinks of death." For what was most aston-
ishing about Benin was the frequency of human sacrifice practiced
there. Burton saw crucified bodies on trees, "green and mildewed
13
skulls lying about like pebbles," bodies in various stages of
decay. The fact that Binis practiced human sacrifice helped
strongly to justify for the British in their own minds whatever
action they took against the city.
12
Burton thought the city difficult to reach, decadent, and
like all West African towns, full of drunken chiefs and thieves.
He knew about the earlier accounts, knew that to the Portuguese
of the 16th century it had been "Great Benin", but believed it
to have been ruined by 1700. 14 By then European trade had stopped
almost completely, the final fatal blow to prosperity coming with
the supression of the slave trade in the 19th century. Burton
believed that whatever greatness there had been in Benin was
to be attributed to contact with Europe and European goods.
The breaking of that brought a return to savagery. Sir Richard
lamented that in the England of his day Benin was just "the
unknown kingdom"."''^
Captian H. L. Gallway, writing some thirty years later,
echoed most of Burton's views when he described his trip to
Benin to secure the treaty. He thought the whole area "the
1
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most unhealthy place in the world." Although he mentioned
the earlier travellers' accounts he felt that little of value
to the administrator was known about the city. To him it was
a frightful place, untouched by Christianity, littered with
skulls and bodies and other evidence of human sacrifices, and
ruled by a king under the thumb of fetish priests who exercised
areignof terror. These two accounts strongly colored the press
presentation of Benin in 1897.
The British knew nothing of the kingdom, the power of the
king, or the way in which political power was used. Gallwey
13
said that not even the king knew the limits of his power. 18
No one knew of the pressures on the kingdom to the north from
the Moslem inhabitants of Nupe; to the west from the city of
Ekiti; and to the east from the Royal Niger Company 19nor indeed,
how the king reacted to pressure from the south, from the Protector-
ate. No one in the Protectorate, or for that matter in the
press at home, even entertained the notion that the powers
within the kingdom of Benin might be alive to external pressures
and in turn, be developing counter strategies to control them.
20Recent historians of West Africa agree that the fate of
places like Benin, in the hinterlands was sealed when in the
last decades of the 19th century informal commercial ties were
#
replaced by formal government protection; government protection,
a kind of inexpensive expansion, replaced by the extension of
administration. The British in the Niger Coast Protectorate
were especially interested in defining their interior boundaries
against the encroachments of the Germans and the French. Bluff
was no longer a safe way of securing boundaries in the mid ' 90 ' s
.
To set a boundary surveys had to be made, and an officer pre-
sent all the time to drive away the interloper.
A further reason for penetration into the hinterland related
to the extension of trade. For centuries Europeans had been
trading with Africans through middlemen, entrepreneurs who would
carry European goods into the interior and return, sometimes
years later, with commodities; at first slaves, and later palm
oil, nuts, and rubber. George Goldie of the Royal Niger Company
14
realized that a more efficient system could be worked out if
the African middleman was removed. The middlemen suffered
in the eyes of the British for having been identified with
2 1the slave trade anyway, and the British often accused
them of controlling trade for their own interests. The
Liverpool traders who worked in the Protectorate lands were
eager for the removal of middlemen because more profit would
accrue to them. Indeed removal of the middlemen formed a part
of Protectorate policy from the very beginning. 22 The extension
of trade, much talked about in the '90's as a good which would
benefit all, was in fact a policy which demanded the elimination
of a large segment of native economy.
A third justification for the extension of rule into the
hinterland was the humanitarian motivation, what one historian
23has aptly called a "rescue service" for natives. Macdonald,
the first Consul General of the Protectorate, typfied many
imperial administrators of his day. He opposed the monopolistic
practices of Goldie in the company lands because he believed
in free trade. He also opposed Goldie' s policy of non-inter-
ference in native affairs because he thought it his duty to
bring civilization to the African people, even if it meant
changing their lives drastically. However, he also believed
that Africans would see the virtues of British civilization
and choose it themselves if they received a proper introduction
to it. The man who followed him as Consul-General , Sir Ralph
Moor, was an able administrator. But in his eagerness to get
15
things done, he lacked the particular patience of his predecesso
In an area as small as the Niger Coast Protectorate this lack
of patience became extremely important in determining events.
While Macdonald intuitively acknowledged the dignity of African
rulers, no matter how small their domain, Moor thought them
despots holding their people in chains. Although the goals
might be the same, the means which these two men employed
were vastly different. Where Macdonald had used the palaver,
Moor favored the punitive expedition.
Under Moor the punitive expedition against the king of
Benin was mounted and the expected results achieved. The
expedition, a complete success, could be pointed to with pride
as a masterpiece of planning and adaptability to the unforseen.
The "bloodthirsty monarch" was removed and the rule of law put
in his place. The land was opened up to trade. The advance
of civilization was expressed by the creating of a native
2 ^4
council, a post office, and a golf links. And the bronzes
from Benin went on show at the British Museum.
16
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CHAPTER TWO: PRELUDE TO PHILLIPS
When the British decided to develop administration in
what had so far been a "paper protectorate", Salisbury approached
Claude Macdonald with the offer of the consul generalship
rather than H. H. Johnston, who had been serving in that capacity.
The foreign minister was interested in a conservative diplomat
for the post rather than a man whom one historian has called a
"rabid imperialist, " lwho might be expected to tax the budget too
quickly. Macdonald, a career soldier, had graduated from Upping-
ham and Sandhurst, had fought in the Egyptian campaign of 1882,
had served as military attache to Sir Evelyn Baring in Cairo,
had been on the Suakin expedition of 1884-85, and had served as
acting consul general in Zanzibar from 1887-88. In 1889 he had
headed a special commission to the Niger territories to decide
what sort of administration should be imposed. Salisbury at
the time favored handing the territories over to the Royal Niger
Company so that Sir George Goldie would have the private respon-
sibility for developing empire in terms of trade. Macdonald,
however, discovered that the Africans, themselves preferred crown
rule. The earl accepted his findings, with modification, and
Macdonald was an obvious choice to head the new Protectorate.
Macdonald had wanted the area, then known as the Oil Rivers,
accepted as a Crown Colony, but the Foreign Office opted for
Protectorate status until such time as an effective administration
o
could be established. Development was to be the key word. So
far as Macdonald was concerned, only the grandchildren of the
20
present generation would reap the rewards of work now being
3done. Reaction to his appointment was favorable. The Times
noted: "He has shown so much competency, tact, and knowledge
of African conditions in the past, and has been so successful
in the performance of many trying duties, that there is every
reason to believe that his appointment to the Oil Rivers will
be attended with the best results." 4 The new consul arrived
in the Protectorate in July, 1891, with his staff and six vice-
consuls. He divided the area into six districts with Old
Calabar, his residence, as the capitol. Bonny and Mew Calabar
constituted the second district, Opobo the third, Brass the
fourth, Warri the fifth, and the Benin River, under Captain
Henry Lionel Gallwey, the sixth. To head a native constabulary
Hacdonald hired Ralph floor. Moor, a young Irishman, had served
as a district inspector in the Irish constabulary, and had re-
signed on private grounds to make his way to the Protectorate. 5
The Foreign Office instructed Macdonald to find out what
treaties had been made with local chiefs, and to make sure the
chiefs understood them. Eventually the Foreign Office hoped to
6bring them all under a "uniform system of government." The
consul was to develop trade, put an end to slavery, and promote
civilization by ending barbarous customs.'
7
The six vice-consuls
possessed a separate Queen's commission to enable them to perform
acts which otherwise would have demanded the permission of
parliament. They then had some degree of freedom, at least in
carrying out the assignments of their chief. The Times had
21
stressed the humanitarian aspect of the administration. It
noted that "the whole of the Consular staff will endeavor by
developing legitimate trade, by promoting civilization, by
inducing the natives to relinquish unhuman and barbarous
customs, and by gradually abolishing domestic slavery, to
pave the way for placing the territories over which Her
Majesty's protection is and may be extended directly under
8British rule." The article further commented upon the for-
mation of the constabulary and noted "in time we may hope
that the law will reach well into the interior, and that free
traffic will be carried on without the intervention of middle-
,,9men
.
11
Goldie, bitterly disappointed at not getting the extension
of territory for which he had hoped, had moved quickly. He
secured treaties from hinterland chiefs before the interior
boundaries were officially settled. He even forged some treat-
ies."^ The head of the Niger Company wanted to make particular
ly sure that the powerful Brassmen would be barred by boundary
from their former markets. The Foreign Office, dimly aware of
the competition, had accepted Goldie 's progressive policy of
direct trade, and had agreed to a line which divided the Brass-
men from their markets."'""'" Both Macdonald and Moor would suffer
from the Foreign Office's lack of foresight.
Macdonald issued his own istructions to his vice-consuls.
They should open up friendly relations with towns near their
stations; assess the natural resources of their areas; sign
22
new treaties; collect intelligence; collect import duties; and
operate postal services. 12 Communication with the hinterland
was essential for effective administration. Macdonald continued
in his area using the methods he knew, the palaver and the treaty. 13
The year 1891 saw no bloodshed and an increased revenue.
In 1892 Vice-Consul Gallwey signed a treaty with the King
of Benin. Gallwey, a graduate of Cheltenham and Sandhurst, the
son of a colonial official serving in Bermuda, was on his first
assignment in West Africa. The year before he had gone into
the hinterland of his district and decided that the Itsekiri
and Urhobo chiefs were incapable of making a treaty, or, if
made, incapable of keeping it. 1 ^ The Bini chiefs he found
somewhat more accessible, for his treaty with the king of Benin
followed upon this initial failure. In his report on the event
he noted "I am of the opinion that there are very great possibilities
for this district. Time and much patience will be required,
however, before the resources of the district can be, even in
a measure, developed, the great stumbling-block to any immediate
advance being the fetish 'reign of terror' which exists through-
out the Kingdom of Benin, and which will require severe measures
in the not very distant future before it can be stopped." "Mow
that a treaty exists between Her Majesty and the King of Benin,"
he added, "it is to be hoped that the undoubted wealth of the
country will be developed, and the barbarous customs, more
especially the human sacrifices, abolished." He concluded,
however, with a question. "How far the King of Benin is to
be trusted remains to be seen; his advisers appeared to me
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to be a set of intriguing and lying individuals.'^ The
implication was clear: the land was promising, but the British
ability to make use of it depended upon the king. If he
would not abide by his treaty, and Gallwey did not think
for a minute that he would, then other measures should be
considered.
Consul-General Macdonald 's Annual Report for the
Protectorate for 1892 showed an increase in revenue from
L96,000 in 1891 to L169,000 and had noted an absence of
conflicts between British and natives. Macdonald received
the KCMG. At home on leave, he summed up his policy to a
Liverpool audience: "....to advance slowly, leaving no bad
or unfinished work behind, to gain the respect and liking of
natives, by a firm and judicious conduct of af fairs .... are
the means which, in my humble opinion, lead to success in
Africa." If Macdonald sensed the incompatibility between
his own ideas and those of his subordinate, Gallwey, he did
not remark on it.
• In the Spring of 1893 the name of the Protectorate was
changed from the Oil Rivers to the Niger Coast Protectorate.
The change reflected a new boundary agreement with the Germans,
concluded in mid-April, 1893. 18 The new boundary extended
German territory northward in order to limit French advances,
for the British feared at this time that the French wished
to forge an east-west link across Africa. 19 Had the French
been able to achieve such a goal it would have threatened the
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British in the Sudan. A bit of hinterland seemed a small
price to pay to prevent the danger.
By 1894 Macdonald's staff had grown to forty people, 20
and by the summer, there had been no bloodshed. At what
did not appear to be a critical time Macdonald went home on
leave and Ralph Moor took over as Acting-Consul-General.
Before his superior returned in December Moor organized
and carried out the first armed expedition against a native
chief in the Protectorate. The object of the attack was
Chief Nana, son of the Itsekiri chief Oluma who had been in
charge of trade in the Benin River in the 1880' s. When
Oluma died the British Consul in the area had appointed
21Nana to succeed him. With the gradual development of
the policy of eliminating African middlemen, openly accepted
in 1891, Nana's days were numbered. Although he had already
been deprived of his title of governor of the river by the
British Consul in 1890, yet he persisted in directing and
controlling trade.
In April of 1894 Macdonald warned him that he did not
have exclusive rights in the river. Nana, however, refused
to give up his privileges. In June, with Macdonald gone,
Moor sent the ship Alecto up the river to threaten him.
The chief momentarily backed down, but in August, he was
back directing trade. Once again Moor sent the Alecto , this
time with directions to fire rockets. The Acting Consul
succeeded, in prodding the lesser chiefs in the river to band
25
together and sign a treaty requesting protection against Nana.
It read: "Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britian and Ireland,
Empress of India, in compliance with the request of the Chiefs
and people of Benin River and Jekri country, hereby undertakes
to extend to them and to the territory under their authority
and jurisdiction, her gracious favor of protection. 1,22
On August 22nd Moor reported to the Foreign Office his
2 3trouble with Chief Nana, " and on the 31st notified them that
he had sustained heavy casualties while reconnoitering in
2 A-the area. The Foreign Office then author! zed him to remove
the troublesome chief. Moor burned and destroyed Nana's
capitol city but the chief managed to flee to Lagos where
he finally gave himself up, throwing himself on the mercy
of the British government and asking the Foreign Office to
25intervene in his behalf. At his trial in Lagos Nana main-
tained that Consul Moor had interferred with his attempts to
control the trade of his sub-chiefs. Subsequently the Consul
had begun "to persecute him, interfering with his trade and
starving his people, and after a time the Alecto came and
2 6blew up his gates." Nana had indeed resisted Moor, fearing
the exile which had been the fate of a previous trader on the
27
river. The chief was found guilty and was exiled; the
Foreign Office sent word that his goods and chattels were
28
to be declared forefeit. A chief more amenable to British
control was put in his place.
But Consul Moor remained unsatisfied with conditions on
26
the river. The Bini appeared likely to take over where Nana
had left off, and an obscure expedition to Benin by a Mr.
McTaggart of the Royal Niger Company made him fear that the
King would be more alert to the liklihood of attack. 29 What-
ever others found there, for Moor Benin was clearly "showing
signs of disturbance." 30 Yet even Moor's picture is ambiguous
it appears from Gallwey's 1892 Report that Moor did not think
the Binis brave fighters; 31 and in his retrospective summary
of his activities at this time Moor wrote "I had all arrange-
ments made for bringing up a force to march into Benin City,
as from the messages I had exchanged with the King I was of
the opinion that very little resistance would be experienced
in establishing a military post there." There is scant
evidence for the opinions of the King after the attack on
Nana, but it is likely that from this time on he feared that
a similar fate would befall him.
Before Moor could move against the king Macdonald
returned to the Protectorate. Moor recalled later, "On the
5th December Sir Claude Macdonald arrived, and I informed him
of the steps taken, when the matter was fully discussed and
the conclusion arrived at that pacific means should be tried
33for a further period...." Macdonald—aware that the other
chiefs were concerned over the treatment meted out to Nana,
fell back upon his former policy, successful since 1888, of
consultation with them in an effort to win their confidence.
He visited Sapele, Warri, Brass, Degema, Bonny, Opobo, and
34Old Calabar, but not Benin.
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In 1895 Sir Claude decided to extend administration to
the Ibo hinterland. The attack of the Brass natives on the
headquarters of the Royal Niger Company at Akassa however,
prevented his acting. This most serious disturbance, which
erupted in February, owed to circumstances extending back
to the founding of the Royal Niger Company, and Goldie's
expressed goal of removing the African middlemen. The Brass-
men, a strong group of up river traders, had for a while
found an ally in the Liverpool African Association, which
sided with them in the hope of crushing Goldie's monopoly.
In June of 1893, however, Goldie had succeeded in winning over
the Liverpool traders. The Brassmen were left defenseless.
The boundary of 1891 had separated their homes from their
markets and with the African Association out of the way,
officials of the company began a systematic attempt to
eliminate the Brassmen as competitors by keeping them from
their markets. The Brassmen Countered with a system of
smuggling hampered by pot shots from the Company shores. In
November, 1894 a new King had succeeded to the Brass throne,
and under him the attack took place. It was a great success:
"The stores and warehouses were looted and torn down. The
Prisoners and booty were loaded into 40 or 50 war-canoes,
and triumphal return to Nimbe began, with drums beating and
flags flying, openly parading past the house of the amazed
35and impotent vice-consul." Retribution was bound to be
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fast. Goldie quite naturally wanted Nimbe destroyed, but
Macdonald, aware of the real grievances of the Brassmen,
urged no reprisals. An attack on British property and the
cannibalising of native servants had to be dealt with how-
ever, and the Royal Navy was ordered to organize an expedition
against Nimbe. The force consisted of two gunboats, one
yacht, two company steamers, three Protectorate launches,
three men of war steam pinnaces, and eight surf boats. They
advanced against Nimbe and the adjoining town and on February 28
Admiral Bedford telegraphed to the Admiralty that he had destroy
ed Fishtown and Nimbe. 3
The raid and subsequent attack occasioned comment in
Parliament and in answer to a query by T. Bayley, Sir Edward
Grey explained that the attack was unexpected. He said "It
was known that the Brassmen, who previously had been in the
position of middlemen and had a monopoly of the trade from the
interior, had lost that monopoly by the opening up of the country
in the interior by the Niger Company. This was believed to
have been the cause of the outbreak." 37 Macdonald had explain-
ed the commercial situation to the Foreign Office, causing
Clement Hill, the Permanent Under-secretary for African Affairs
to comment, regarding Macdonald' s softness, "It is strange
o o
that cannibalism is continuously ignored." On February 28th
Sir Charles Dilke commented in Parliament on Macdonald'
s
assertion that the Company had deprived the Brassmen of their
livelihood, and that natives complained of sniping by Company
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agents. The natives, indeed, claimed that they had been
made to "eat the dust", ^ a dramatic metaphor for the reality
29
of having been cut off by boundary from their food supply.
Dilke proposed that there be an inquiry, and Grey agreed to
hold one. The subsequent inquiry headed by Sir John Kirk,
recommended that customs barriers be removed between Company
and Protectorate lands and that the Company function as
a purely administrative unit, as had the East India Company
in its last years of power in India.
With the situation settled, at least in theory, Macdonald
once again prepared to return to England. Before leaving
he discussed the Benin situation with Moor, who would be in
charge during his absence. They agreed that Vice-Consul
Major Copeland-Crawford should make an attempt to reach the
city of Benin on a friendly visit. 42 Macdonald left, not
for the leave he had anticipated, but to be transferred to
Peking. On his recommendation, Ralph Moor became Consul
General.
Moor wanted Gallwey, the original appointee in the Benin
district as his Deputy Commissioner, but the Foreign Office
appointed James R. Phillips instead. 43 Phillips had served
in a variety of jobs in West Africa and his appointment was
due either to seniority or influence at home. His father was
an archbishop in England, whereas Gallwey' s was an administrator
in Bermuda.
As Consul General, Moor outlined his plans for Lord
Salisbury. He intended to undertake peaceful expeditions to
30
oris
explain the aim of government and to start friendly relati
with native chiefs; he hoped to organize native councils in
towns where friendly reception occurred; he planned surveys
for roads and resources; he intended to make treaties of
peace and friendship. But he also would inflict punishments
and suppress piracy.
^
When Moor assumed his duties three areas demanded his
immediate attention: Brass, to be administered according to
the report of Commissioner Kirk; the Cross River where trade
was disrupted by rival fighting; and the Bonny and Opobo
hinterland already earmarked by Macdonald as the next target
for the extension of rule. 45 Less pressing, but important
«
to Moor was the situation in Benin. A pattern emerges in
Moor's dispositions of these areas. In the case of Brass,
he offered concessions which he had worked out with Goldie.
When they were rejected by the king, he went over the king's
head and established a native council. To the warring
Cross towns he sent a force of 180 men under Captains
Roupell and Cockburn who shelled and burned them. He had
heard that human sacrifice was practiced in the two hinter-
land towns. Against one he organized an expedition with
Gallwey of 105 men. Even though the king asked for peace
Moor deported him and his priests, and burned the juju houses
Captain Roupell led 120 troops into the other town, burned
the houses, chopped down trees, and looted what was left
of the livestock .
^
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In dealing with Benin Moor was less successful. Major
Copeland-Crawford left for Benin in August, 1895. Messages
had been sent by Crawford to King Overami to inform him of
the intended visit and arrangements for guides to carry the
men into the bush were complete. On August 3rd a detachment
of 30 men and a maxim gun arrived under the command of Capt-
ain Maling to escort Crawford. Some days later the messengers
to the king returned. They reported the king anxious about
the expedition for he had heard that a large number of war-
ships sailed to attack him. The king's own messenger who
accompanied Crawford's agents, was to personally see whether
the rumor was true. After assuring the King's messenger that
no warships accompanied the expedition, Crawford started out.
He arrived by boat at the town of Gwato, 20 miles from Benin
and was warned by friendly natives not to land. When he
disembarked anyway, his carriers refused to march the rest
of the way to Benin and left him in the night. Crawford went
home
.
In his subsequent report to the Foreign Office, Captain
Crawford included some details about an exchange of notes with
the king in which the latter complained about his being unable
to get gun powder after his signing the treaty with the Queen.
Crawford concluded
:
"Notes have been made as to Gwato town, its
approaches and capabilities for the housing of
troops in case of any further trouble ; the same
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has been done with respect to Oubagilligilli
about 3/4 of a mile from Gwato on the same bank.Information has also been gained of the water-
way to Icoro, another route to Benin city; rough
soundings have been taken occasionally from thefirst island in Gwato Creek to the junction of
Icoro and Gwato town Creek. Captain Mailing hastaken a rough sketch plan of Gwato town and its,,
approaches, which is duly forwarded to you " 47
In recording his experiences later for Macmillan's Mag-
azine Crawford mentioned a conversation supposed to have taken
place before his expedition, between a British officer and the
king of Benin. When asked if he would extend trade the king
replied, "I have allowed the white queen to place four small
factories at the mouth of my river; but I am always King of
Benin, and the next white man who enters my creek will be
48
shot." Crawford also talked about an ivory fence and fine
stores of ivory worth LI, 400 a ton, which he had heard about
49from traders. The king of Benin, Crawford thought, was
"merely a blood-thirsty savage", but he wanted to point out
that there was more to Africa than savages. He compared
the subjects of Benin, "heathen and rank savages", to the negro*
to the north, "tinged with the semi-civilization of the Arabs":
It was easy to distinguish them: "the one is a savage; the
other is something better. " ^ Crawford was not alone in this
feeling of aversion toward natives of the Protectorate in
favor of Moslem negroes. Ralph Moor, when organizing the
constabulary in 1891 had chosen Hausas from the north, think-
ing them more reliable than the inhabitants of the Protector-
-53ate
.
Moor sent Crawford's official report to the Foreign
Office with his own conclusions. He explained that few have
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ever reached the city, but at least one who had stated:
"Benin city reeked of human blood.- 53 Human sacrifices,
Moor asserted, were frequent. The treaty of 1892 had been
practically inoperative. The king according to Moor's
interpretation, had refused to see Crawford because of his
juju celebrations for new yams which occasioned numerous
human sacrifices. The country should be brought under
British control "if necessary by force". Finally the
Consul concluded, "I am sure that any expenditure incurred
would be fully compensated by the large increase that would
result in the sale of British manufactured goods in the
country opened up." )Zf
Recalling the report later Moor commented: "I recommend-
ed that force should be employed to open up this country to
civilization and trade and to prevent the horrible human
sacrifices and cruelties which were continually taking place
therein. The instructions in reply to this were that pacific
measures should be employed for a further period before re-
5 5
sorting to force."
Nothing further happened in Benin until the Fall of
1896 when Moor went home on leave, leaving his Deputy
Commissioner, James Phillips, in charge.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PHILLIPS MASSACRE
Phillips was certainly aware of the programs and policies
of his chief. Perhaps he and Moor had even talked over the
possibility of carrying out an expedition against the king of
Benin in the dry months of 1897. At any rate, in November of
1896, shortly after he assumed his duties as Consul General,
he wrote to Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office: "I ask his
Lordship's permission to visit Benin City in February next, to
depose and remove the King of Benin, and to establish a native
council in his place, and take such further steps for the open-
ing up of the country as the country may require." 1 Furthermore
Moor was "fully cognizant of all matters dealt with in this
despatch". As an afterthought, probably with Crawford in mind,
Phillips added: "I have reason to hope that sufficient ivory
may be found in the Kings house to pay the expenses incurred in
removing the King from his stool." 2 He obviously added this
optimistic hope in order to encourage Lord Salisbury, disincline
to spend a penny more than necessary on West Africa.
For reasons which remain obscure, Phillips, while waiting
for a reply from the Foreign Office, decided to make a prior
visit to the king. Perhaps, confident of Salisbury's approval,
he wanted to make one last try to bring about by peaceful means
what would inexorably come by force. Several other officers
from the Protectorate agreed to go with him on a peaceful
mission; Captain Maling, who had been with Crawford as the
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intelligence officer in 1895; Crawford himself, just back from
leave; Locke, one of the men whcm the Brass chiefs had accused
of harraunging them; and Captain Alan Boisragon, who had re-
placed Moor as head of the constabulary. Boisragon wrote a
newsy letter home to his wife on November 25th announcing the
expedition, and giving as a reason for it that Phillips wished
3to see the city. The leaders decided to include traders who
knew the country. They invited the representatives of James
Pinnock of Liverpool to go with them. Pinnock had been with
Gallwey in 1892. Unable to go himself, he sent two other
traders, Powis and Gordon, in his stead. 4 Powis was compar-
atively new to the river, but Gordon, who Brassmen had also
mentioned, had been in the area for about five years and was
popular with the traders.
While he proceeded with his own arrangements for this
small expedition, Phillips sent to the Foreign Office a letter
which he had solicited from Mr. J. W. Brownridge, an agent for
the Scottish trading company of Alexander Miller. The letter
intended to encourage action on his scheme. It outlined the
sorry state of affairs in Benin and attempted to pinpoint the
blame on the king. It began:
"In answer to your request for a few
facts regarding Benin and its trade, I may say
that the primary cause of the present stoppage
of trade is the raising of the price of guns,
powder and gin.
"The king, finding that he cannot buy
these articles at the price he likes, is now
keeping on the stoppage to extort as much money
as possible from the Jackris. Stoppages of trade
are of common occurance in Benin. . .
.
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"There are also various times in theyear stoppages on account of fetish, when
numbers of human beings are sacrificed
the subjects of the King of Benin have no'inducement to trade whatever. Were a nati
to trade well and amass money, it would behighly dangerous to him; the king or his
chiefs would bring some trumpery charge
of whitchcraft against him, which either
means death or the loss of all his money "
There followed further references to the dreadfulness
of life in Benin, whose people suffered robbery and menace
of the King's messengers. Brownridge concluded:
"The stable articles of trade in this
country are salt, common fathom cloths,
and gin, etc., silk and other superior
articles being very little bought,
which goes to show they are a very poor
race. This, I think, is through the
lack of opportunity, and the insecur-
ity of life and property .... I f Benin
was under proper government, and the
resources of the country properly de-
veloped, I am firmly of the opinion
that the exports would be very great.
So long as the King ofBenin is allow-
ed to carry on as he is doing at pre-
sent it means simply losses to the mer-
chants, native Jackri trade, as also
the Protectorate . "5
.The letter obviously fortified Phillips conviction that
he should attack the king. And here, from both the commercial
and humanitarian viewpoints, was ample justification. But
Francis Bert ie
,
permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office
had already taken some steps of his own, even before the Brown
ridge letter arrived. On December 24th he forwarded Phillips
first letter to Consul-General Moor, then in London. At the
same time Bertie requested information from the Intelligence
Division of the Foreign Office about the feasibility of a
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punitive expedition to Benin.
Moor responded immediately. 6 For Bertie's, and ultimately
Lord Salisbury's, benefit he attempted to recapitulate the
connection which he and the Protectorate had maintained with
the King and City of Benin. He referred to his plans of
November, 1894 when, after putting down Chief Nana, he had
hoped to move on to Benin, only to be told by Macdonald to
pursue peaceful means. He told of how he and Macdonald had
decided upon sending Copland-Crawford to Benin in the summer
of 1895, of the failure of that visit, his own desire to use
force, and of Macdonald' s instructions again to follow peace-
ful measures. Moor stated that such measures had been tried,
»
but
"....further pacific measures are quite use-
less and only likely to damage the prestige of
the Government with all the surrounding native
tribes. The state of the case", Moor continued,
"and the position of affairs is generally very
clearly put by Mr. Phillips, but he does not, I
think, lay sufficient stress on the human sac-
rifices which it is known are carried on exten-
sively and the state of abject misery in which
the people are kept by the exactions of the King
and his JuJu men, and by their being prevented
trading ....Both European and native Jekri traders
are being gradually ruined by the attitude adopted
by the King, and the advance of civilization is
actually stopped."/
Moor, convinced as he had been for sometime that force was
now the only remedy, seemed to assume his readers at the Foreign
Office of like mind. For he now addressed himself to the ques-
tion of what size force should be used. In determining size,
he wished his superiors to know that he was confident that all
j
necessary intelligence work had been carried out, and that a
reliable guess as to the expected enemy force could be made. -
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"The king", he said "should be deposed and removed from the
country, and the ring of JuJu men broken up." The only time
to carry out the operations, he felt, would be February or
March before the rains. He anticipated scant opposition from
Benin, but suggested that a gunboat and a small force of marines
with a Maxim gun should be used. Moor stated his willingness
to proceed to the Protectorate immediately, if such should be
thought necessary.
While he digested Moor's comments Bertie received a reply
from the Intelligence Division on the 30th "on the subject of
a possible punitive expedition to be undertaken against the
gKing of Benin...." The writer warned of but scanty information
"as to this potentate's power of resistence". Moor had based
his opinion solely on the chance comment of Gallwey in 1892
that the Binis were not brave and not likely to be helped by
their neighbors. The intelligence correspondent referred to
Gallwey 1 s report "that the population of Benin city does not
exceed 10,000." He briefly described the approach to the city
and argued that a force of 400 native troops officered by Eng-
lishmen and armed with breech-loaders, 2 seven pound guns, one
Maxim and one rocket apparatus, should be adequate. He mention-
ed that Sir John Ardagh "conscious of the untoward results which
might ensue from the jamming of the single Maxim gun detailed
to accompany the force would, as a matter of precaution, prefer
to see another of these weapons added to the armament of the
troops forming the expedition." The objection to a large force,
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the writer pointed out, was that it would destroy the element
of surprise. With surprise assured, the force proposed should
be adequate. The Brownridge letter arrived on the 1st of Jan-
uary, and on the 4th the Colonial Office sent word that Joseph
Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, would "instruct the officer
administering the Government of Lagos to render Mr. Phillips
such assistence as he can with regard to the contemplated
q
expedition.
"
All seemed in readiness for Phillips to move in February,
but on the 6th of January word came from the Intelligence Div-
ision to the Foreign Office that it would not be safe to remove
troops from Lagos at the moment. Perhaps troops could be ob-
tained from the Gold Coast, Sir John Ardagh had suggested.
^
A small force of marines could also be included. There followed
some checking around to see if troops might be obtained from
the Gold Coast. It was discovered that they were unavailable,
being occupied in manoeuvres against Bona, Wa and Gambaga
.
^
^
Sir Clement Hill summed up the situation for his chief
Lord Salisbury on January 6th . Phillips, Hill noted, had pro-
posed 400 men, and Sir John Ardagh did not consider it safe,
with the limited information available, to go ahead with fewer.
Moor, however, Sir Clement continued, believed two gun-boats
might safely substitute for the loss of from 150 to 250 troops.
Hill reviewed correspondance dating back to 1895. When Moor
proposed action in that year he had not thought the Protectorate
force adequate. Hill now averred:
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IloriT^L^ thr G ° ld C °aSt "Hinterland",
ib?rSiffiLu
1fw^nany ' S ^Pedi tion, the'poss-Die a tticulty ith Brass, the necessitv nfkeeping New Calabar back, and the ordinary
^c^
in dealing with him now.... The native traders Ire
R^Mc^f ^ haVe aPPealed protection; theBritish traders urge action. There will be some
l°
SS
°LVVeA^ ^ We abstain > ^d that may leadto greater difficulties hereafter; but a failurewould be worse, and the means locally at our dis-posal seem hardly adequate to make sure of success,though I do not think the risk is great."
Lord Salisbury apparently thought the risk of failure •
greater than the possible loss of prestige. He wrote to
Phillips on January 9^ that the expedition would have to be
postponed for another year because 400 troops could not now
be raised."^
With the planned expedition which Moor had hoped for since
1894 cancelled, affairs in the Protectorate should have returned
to their usual quiet, and faded into the background of concern
at the African desk in the Foreign Office. It might have been
so had not Phillips, while waiting for word, decided upon a
preliminary, and as it turned out, fatal, unarmed expedition
to the King. On January 10th
,
just one day after word had been
sent to inform him of the postponment, a telegram reached the
Foreign Office from the Benin district, informing them that
Phillips and those with him had been ambushed on their way
to Benin, and were supposed dead.
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II
The explanation of why Phillips had undertaken this
preliminary trip never came out.
When the telegram arrived at the Foreign Office, it
caused considerable commotion. Salisbury, at his country
home, was immediately notified and came directly into London
from Hatfield. 13 Ralph Moor was called in for immediate
consultation with Curzon, the Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, and Sir Thomas Saunderson, Permanent Secretary at
the Foreign Office. Mr. Goschen, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, was informed. The Manchester Guardian noted
that "most of the captives" for they were not then known
to be dead, "were well known in official and club circles
in London.
"
Almost immediately the wheels were set in motion for a
punitive expedition to be carried out against the king. No
one spoke in public of the arrangements of the previous two
weeks. The press, and through them the public, knew only that
savage natives had ambushed government officials. Soon they
learned that the ambush had resulted in death. On January 26th
the papers carried a telegram from Gallwey: "No possible
doubt, Phillips, Maling, Crawford, Campbell, and Elliot shot
dead in the ambush. Boisragon and Locke in no danger." 1 "*
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Nor was there any doubt that the group had been unarmed when
attacked. Captain Boisragon, 16 safely back in the Protector-
ate, related how Phillips had insisted that they go without
weapons visible. 17 Since the weather was hot, 18 probably in
the low eighties, they wore no jackets and consequently had
their revolvers in their baggage, carried by porters some
distance behind them. When first attacked Boisragon announc-
ed that he was going to get his revolver. But Phillips, in
a moment of high drama, and no doubt still hopeful, commanded:
"No revolvers, gentlemen, no revolvers!" Thus he and his com-
panions died. Boisragon and Locke, both wounded, crawled into
the thick bush and, drinking dew and eating leaves for five
days, made their way painfully back to safety.
The apparent circumstances, therefore, cried out for
vengence. Policy statements were unnecessary. The papers
could now create a picture of the king and of his society which
would explain the ghastly act. Available information about the
city was difficult to interpret. The accounts of Burton and
19Gallwey emerged as authoritative and human sacrifice as
the single most interesting fact. For the first time Benin,
the City of Blood, became generally known in England.
Papers first carried news of the disaster on the 12th .
The Times simply named those English officials known to have
been on the expedition. The Manchester Guardian located the
city some 60 miles up the Benin River, "a large town, the
seat of a powerful theocracy of fetish priests (which) used
c- ..20
to be famous for its human sacrifices."
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On January iff* the Guardian talked of the "Benin tyrant- and
reported an interview with Sir John Kirk who had conducted
the Brass inquiry of 1895. In the interview he described
the Benin people as "a degraded race very much on a level
with the Ashantis...." The Oba, Kirk said, although he ad-
mitted that he personally knew nothing of the king, "stops
all trade to Benin, will allow no white trader to enter his
district, and was constantly having executions." Kirk summed
up his feeling about the whole area as follows:
"I heard.... not from people who were likely
to exaggerate, but from people who had been there
and described what they saw, that there were dead
bodies and remains of executions lying about the
town. It was absolutely certain that there must
have been an expedition against him sooner or later
if he did not reform, and I do not think there was
the least chance of his giving up his evil customs,
as he was entirely in the hands of the fetish priests.
It was a disgrace upon any civilized Protectorate to
have such a center in its sphere. "21
The death of Phillips offered proof of the savage char-
acter of Benin, proof of the need for a civilizing mission.
A humanitarian interpretation, complete with evil leaders and
people needing to be saved from them dominated the telling of
the Benin story. Hints in the press that another type of
expedition had been planned against the king with no Phillips
to justify it went unnoticed. A Reuters correspondant in Liver-
pool interviewed a trader who chose not to reveal his name, who said
"An attack upon Benin had been much talked of. For two years
at least it has been threatened, and I have no doubt at all
that the king of Benin has been fully acquainted with all these
22
rumours .
"
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Thomas Gordon, one of the traders killed in the massacre, had
confided to an artist for the Illustrated London News in the
previous year that an expedition was in the offing, 23 and Sir
Alfred Jephson, the Agent General for the Protectorate until
1895, related in an interview for The Times
, "It has always
been recognized that eventually Benin City must be taken and
trade allowed to flow towards the sea, but it was clearly
understood that the King could not be smashed without the
employment of a properly prepared force." 24 The implicit
criticism of Phillips, which only came out officially in
1899, and the hint that policy questions were involved went
unnoticed. The overwhelming impression created by the press
was that the expedition being mounted against the king was a
result of his attack on Phillips.
From the time that the massacre was announced until the
punitive expedition left, the press identified the people of
Benin and the King in an unfavorable light. As a race they
were "reported to be indolent, cowardly, and chiefly occupied
25
with agricultural pursuits and the production of palm oil."
The Oba of Benin's country is the most barbarous spot of the
whole Protectorate , "and the outrage which he has not feared
to commit upon the British expedition rendered inevitable the
speedy end of a system which has been allowed to endure too
long." 26 In an article which referred to the King as a "savaj
potentate" the two men who had escaped, Boisragon and Locke
were described as "splendid fellows . . . . just the men one would
expect to survive the danger, fatigue, and privation of the
long struggle through the bush which they appeared to have
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undergone." 27 To another reporter the natives of Benin were
"utterly barbarous", ruled by a king of "fierce and cruel
disposition". "Human sacrifices are there even more frequent
than in Ashanti or Dahomey before European intervention." 28
Consul-General Moor added his weight: the king was "certainly
29a barbarian". An expedition against him would extend British
authority throughout the area, end the atrocities constantly
committed there, establish peaceable government, promote trade,
and improve the condition of the natives. Removal of the ruler
would open up the resources of the Protectorate to the entire
30population. And in Liverpool, the trader, James Pinnock,
chairing a meeting of the Geographical Society in which Benin
was the center of interest, declared: "Our bluejackets, West
Indian troops, and forces of the Niger Coast Protectorate
would soon clear this Gehenna, which was at present a disgrace
31to the whole civilized world."
Behind this type of rhetoric lay the firm conviction that
Britain had a job to do to rescue natives from the clutches of
incompetent and evil rulers. One writer talked of the veneer
of civilization which often shielded the casual visitor to the
West African coast from the truth: "Scarcely a few miles from
the station where officialism reigns supreme," he wrote, "are
to be found the rankest superstitions and a swarming native
population, a prey to fetish worship and the cunning priests
who hold sway in its name. It is an indisputable fact that,
although in some parts of the West Coast Europeans have traded
and factories have existed for quite 200 years, yet no success-
ful attempt has up to now been made to rescue the native pop-
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ulation from grovelling superstition and ignorance." For this
writer Gallwey was the authority and he talked in 1892 about
the disgusting sights he had seen: "there is little cause to
think that matters have improved since that time the favor-
ite mode of execution is crucifixion, the victim being sac-
rificed on any occasion when the malevolence of evil spirits
requires to be appeased." He concluded, "although little
authentic knowledge of the Benin people is current, the main
characteristics of the surrounding tribes are thought to be
theirs also in an intensified degree, finding expression in
habits of disgusting brutality and scenes of hideous cruelty
and bloodshed, ordained by the superstition of a degraded race
32
of savages . "
Not until February 1st could the press present any infor-
mation about the immediate cause of the massacre, but it only
reinforced the impression already conveyed about Benin. On
that day The Times carried a first hand report from a Reuters
correspondant in the area. "The king", he wrote, "was carry-
ing out an annual butchery of slaves, and did not want to see
the white man, who had been received at Gwato, the landing
place for the city, with a friendly welcome, and who, under
the impression that matters were all right, had proceeded on
their journey. They simply intended to remonstrate with the
35
King against these fearful butcheries." That Phillips was
on a purely humanitarian mission, and that the king had perpe-
trated the massacre because he did not want to be interrupted
in the middle of his human sacrifices became an acceptable
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rendering of events. Added to it was the probability of
treachery. The king had actually lured Phillips into an
ambush by ordering a welcome for him, according to Boisragon,
who stated that as the party advanced from Gwato the ruler
had sent them cordial messages. 36
The press switched its attention from the explanations
of the massacre to accounts of the punitive expedition after
it began on February 15, but the official details of the mass-
acre and expedition did not shed much light on either Phillips'
intentions or the Bini motivation for the massacre. It did
note the size of Phillips party— 11 white men, 200 native
carriers, a government interpreter, the consul-general's chief
cook and clerk, 2 orderlies, 1 store keeper, 1 servant to each
officer, and the drum and fife band from the Protectorate. The
band had been sent back from Gwato because a friendly chief
along the way had convinced Phillips that it would give a war-
like impression. Its own prior intentions against the king,
the Foreign Office did not reveal and so shed no light on
Phillips' reasons for undertaking the trip. He had not notif-
ied them before leaving. The Parliamentary paper included
Moor's estimate of the whole venture in a letter he had written
to Admiral Rawson, the commander-in-Chief of the punitive
expedition:
"The operations in their result up to the pres-
ent have not served in any way the ill-fated expedit-
ion of the late consul Phillips, all the members of
which, except perhaps a few natives, are, I fear,
murdered; but they will, I trust, be far-reaching
in doing away with a barbarism as appalling as ever
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witnessed by Europeans and bringing the benefits
or civilization to a most wretched people.
At the time Moor wrote, August of 1897, the king was still
at large in the bush. Not until 1899 when the last of the
chiefs involved in the massacre was finally brought to trial,
did Moor admit that Phillips had shown poor judgment. Then it
came out that he had been warned repeatedly by several friendly
chiefs to turn back, but had persisted in pushing on. 39 Even
then, however, the question of why he had gone could not be
answered
.
Boisragon published a full account of the trip and the
massacre in September, 1897, but it threw remarkably little
light on the question of motivation. Could Boisragon not
have known of the plans which Phillips was making with the
Foreign Office? He recapitulated what had happened in Benin
since Gallwey's visit of 1892. No white man had been in the
city since then, except MacTaggart of the Royal Niger Company,
the man who had so annoyed Consul-General Moor. Boisragon
talked of the removal of Chief Nana but gave no reasons for
the attack against him. He did mention, however, that in re-
sponse to the treatment meted out to Nana, the King of Benin
had ceased to trade with the British.^ Boisragon credited
Moor with success in getting Overami to open up trade again,
but claimed that the King started to charge tribute. Shortly
after Phillips took over in the Protectorate the king raised
his price, and Phillips urged the chiefs of the river not to
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pay. As a result of a meeting of the chiefs, with Phillips
present, a note went to the king, announcing a visit. "The
object of the expedition", according to Boisragon, "was to
try and persuade the king to let white men come up to his
city whenever they wanted to. All their horrible customs
could not be put down at once, except by a strong-armed
expedition; but could be stamped out gradually by officials
continually going up. Trade would also be opened up." 41 This
line Macdonald had always taken, convinced that inhumane cus-
toms had to be stopped, but through peaceful means. If Phillips
had been committed to these means, why had he written to
Salisbury asking for armed support to remove the king and
establish a native council? Perhaps his meeting with the
chiefs had occurred after he wrote the letter, and they
had convinced him that the king would listen to reason. Per-
haps he wanted to make a name for himself before Moor returned.
Boisragon, if he knew, did not tell. But he was convinced of
the treachery of the king and the complicity of the whole
countryside. He recounted how as they passed a certain spot
they had their feet washed by JuJu priests, a sign that they
had the freedom of the country. Then "At each village, as we
halted, some of the men came out to welcome us, grinned all
round their black faces, and seemed very pleased to see us
—
knowing as they did what was in store for us, for I suppose
44
they all expected to get a share of the forth-coming loot."
Sufficient cause for the murder, according to Boisragon, had
been the audacity of the white men in coming ahead when the
43
king did not wish to be disturbed in the midst of sacrific-
ing "some hundreds of unfortunate slaves."^5
The innocence of the king, and his precise role in the
massacre was not known until late September 1897, but by that
time the city had been destroyed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PUNITIVE EXPEDITION
The British Foreign Office mastermined the expedition
against the king, calling upon the resources of the admiralty
and those of the imperial forces in Sierre Leone. Admiral
Harry Rawson commander of the fleet at the Cape received the
supreme command and his orders were to rescue survivors, to
punish the king, and to occupy the town. 1 By January 30th
ships and men for the expedition had rendezvoused in Sierre
Leone, coming from the far corners of the empire. Rawson,
now acting on his own discretion, decided upon a force of a
2thousand men, nearly three times the number thought necessary
by the Foreign Office. Taking no chances he decided upon a
three-pronged attack upon the city which would allow for no
escape to the. south. Rawson himself would accompany the center
group which would take the city, the other two acting to encircle
the area, and if necessary, drive hostile forces inward. On
February 6th with all arrangements complete, the slow march
forward began.
When the Foreign Office gave over the commard to Admiral
Rawson, a naval commander who had never set foot in the Pro-
tectorate and who, in his actions there in the first few days
revealed his ignorance of past Protectorate policy, it sanctioned
conquest. As the three forces advanced towards the city of Benin
they destroyed what lay in their way. One eye-witness recorded
the procedure followed by the troops upon entering a native
village on the way to Benin:
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As the launch and surf boats grounded we jumped
into the water, which reached to our waists, at
once placed our Maxims and guns in position, fir-
ing so as to clear the bush where the natives
might be hiding. We rushed on some hundred yards,
again put our guns in position, and, in conjunct-
ion with volley firing, again cleared the bush 4
All who stood in their way had become the enemy. Unfortunately
this carnage was characteristic of the advance.
By the morning of February 17th the central force, led by
Admiral Rawson and Consul General Moor, and consisting of 250
Protectorate troops, 120 marines, 100 sailors, 30 scouts and
six medical men, was within striking distance of Benin. All
that day they advanced under heavy return fire in the unaccustom-
ed heat and the unfamiliar terrain, forced to walk in single
file because of the narrowness of the bush paths. 5 That night
they camped six miles from Benin. Early the next morning they
broke camp and marched for seven hours, fired upon constantly.
At last, dry, dirty and exhausted, but with their Maxims hav-
ing secured them entrance, they came to a clearing in the path.
Before them spread out a broad avenue, unlike anything they had
sofar seen, and beyond it, enveloped in a cloud of dust, lay
the ancient city of Benin.
The Bini warriors left in the city fired from behind an
embankment, but the second-hand ordnance of the European trader
to the West African coast could not match British machine guns,
and soon the last of the Oba's men disappeared into the dense
and protective bush. The city belonged to the British. Word
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reached London in The Times on February 23rd, with a tele-
gram from Consul-General Moor: "Advanced from Ologbo 14**
in two columns, joined upon the 16th
, Benin city taken after-
noon 18 th ." In Parliament, at the request of Sir John Colomb
of Great Yarmouth, Moor's telegram was read to the house. 6
II
The men, after they had slaked their thirst, now had to
clean up the city. All natives, including the King and the
*
priests had fled Benin into the surrounding bush to the north
when the fate of the city seemed sealed. There were no prison-
ers taken, only the wounded of the attacking force to care for
and the bodies of those left behind by the Binis to be removed.
The seemingly hundreds of corpses which the Punitive force came
upon were not casualties from the fighting, but the remains of
human sacrifices • The scene indelibly impressed itself upon
the senses of those who witnessed it. Felix Roth, a doctor
with the expedition, summed up his reaction:
"As we neared Benin City we passed several
human sacrifices, live women-slaves gagged and
pegged on their backs to the ground, the abdom-
inal wall being cut in the form of a cross, and
the uninjured gut hanging out. These poor women
were allowed to die like this in the sun. Men-
slaves, with their hands tied at the back, and
feet lashed together, also gagged, were lying
about. As our white troops passed these horrors
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When they reached the King's compound they found things
as they had been left. Roth described the scene:
"In the king's compound, on a raised platform or
altar, running the whole breadth of each, beautifulidols were found. All of them were caked over withhuman blood and by giving them a slight tap, crusts
of blood would, as it were, fly off. Lying about
were big bronze heads, dozens in a row, with holes
at the top, in which immense carved ivory tusks
were fixed. One can form no idea of the impression
it made on us. The whole place reeked of blood.
Fresh blood was dripping off the figures and altars..." 8
On the night of the 18 th the men slept out in the open
amidst the death and debri too sickened by the smell of blood
to sleep in the compounds. The next morning they set about
burning those compounds and destroying the JuJu houses. All
through the city they came upon bones, skulls and bodies.
In front of the palace they found trees upon which human
sacrifices had been carried out, and heaps of bones mildewed
around the bottom. In the surrounding bush they found more
bodies, decapitated. "It was a grusome sight," wrote Roth,
"to see these headless bodies sitting about, the smell being
9
awful." The troops discovered a large pit full of bodies
from which emanated screams. To their surprise they managed
to pull out some of the carriers who had been with Phillips.
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Those unfortunates told how Phillips and his men had been
killed on the Gwato road, but not brought in to the city to
be sacrificed. Only their belongings reached the Palaver
house where Roth and the others found them. 10
In the midst of the blood Roth's sense of beauty was. also
touched. He thought the King's house really quite extra-
ordinary. He made note of the delicate brass figures embossed
on the doors of the palace, and of the artistically carved
rafters. 11 Another eye-witness, Intelligence Officer Bacon
writing later, was also moved to comment on the "handsomely
carved ivory tusks" and the "very antique bronze heads." 12
Some of the objects, he thought, showed traces of Egyptian
design, or perhaps Chinese influence. 13 In a tour of the
city he saw no evidence of industry other than a blacksmith's
shop and perhaps concluded that the art objects were not
indigenous. Their beauty was marred, however, by the use to
which they were put: "Blood was everywhere," he wrote, "smear'
ed over bronzes, ivory, and even the walls, and spoke the his-
tory of that awful city in a clearer way than writing ever
could. And this had been going on for centuries! Not the
lust of one king, not the climax of a bloody reign, but the
religion (save the word!) of the race.
On the 20th the systematic destruction of the city began.
Admiral Rawson, with a strong force went to Ojumo, a chief's
compound, at the beginning of the Gwato road and burned it.
He also burned chief Ochudi's compound, consisting of more
than a hundred houses, "whose roofs made a good blaze." 15
On Rawson's orders all the houses in the area about the King's
compound were cleared for purposes of protection. 16 Another
party went to the Queen Mother's house and destroyed it.
On the 21st an unplanned fire broke out in the afternoon.
It jumped from hut to hut, even burning the trees. Roth
commented
:
"As soon as we noticed it, we removed our medical
stores; the men tried to move their stores but were
too late, and most of them had everything burnt.
Even the things which had been placed in the middle
of the big compounds caught fire, the heat being
very great. In less than an hour the conflagrat-
ion had burnt itself out, and the whole place was
strewn with ashes. The next day we found what a
blessing had come to us, for fire, smoke and char-
coal seemed to have removed all the smell, and the
city became sweet and pure again."-1-'
Bacon's opinion of the fire matched Roth's. To him:
"there was a dim grandeur about it all, and also •
there seemed to be a fate.... fire only could
purge it, and here on our last day we were to
see its legitimate fate overtake it, and see
this, the centre of bloodshed, burn before our
eyes in retribution for the millions of lives
that had been wilfully sacrif iced . " 18
On the morning of the 22nd, as Moor had predicted, the
white force, having accomplished its mission, prepared to
march back to the sea. Only on the next day would London
learn of their success, and readers of The Times be treated
to the Reuter's description of Benin: "The whole town reeks
of human blood, and the bodies of many sacrificed and crucifie
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human beings have been found about the place. This after-
noon the forces have been occupied in the destruction of
•crucifixion trees' and
-JuJu' houses, thereby breaking the
power of the fetish priests." 19
The Commander-in-Chief and his naval brigade reached
Warrigi on the Z4*; the Sapobar force on the 25*, and the
Gwato force, on the 27th
. By the evening of the 27th the
whole white force had reembarked. A week later the hospital
ship Malacca left for Britain, and on March 13th Admiral Raw-
son was back in South Africa. The force, and indeed the
Expedition, won praises and encouragement from the press and
honors from the Queen. Rawson was elevated to the Order of
the Bath, and 18 awaras went to officers who had taken part
2 0in the expedition.
Ill
Once the navy and marines had left the city the officials
of the Protectorate set about organizing an administration.
Moor felt it imperative that he finish the expedition accord-
ing to his own lights, including the final deposition of the
King. "It is imperative" he wrote to Salisbury, "that a most
severe lesson be given the Kings, Chiefs, and JuJu men of all
surrounding countries, that white men cannot be killed with
impunity, and that human sacrifices, with the oppression of
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the weak and poor must cease,- 2 ^ Moor felt that the permanent
results expected from the expedition had not yet been achieved
"The punishment of the individuals responsiblefor the massacre is of these the first for ifwill be an object-lesson in civilization lor
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When a Permanent Resident for Benin was appointed, Moor
was free to pursue the King into the bush.
Moor had never doubted the king guilty of the Phillips
massacre, nor had any other British. It was Bertie's note
to the War Office of January 14<* which reflected this
assumption as did Galfwey's ultimatum to the king, forwarded
to the Foreign Office. 23 As more information about events
in Benin filtered out, his guilt seemed assured. Perhaps, as
The Times commented on the 9 th
,
the king might have been mis-
guided by reports from his chiefs to the effect that the white
men were spies. If so, Moor might prove complicity and arrest
them as well as the king. On March 12* the Consul reported
to Salisbury that he had tracked after the king to the north,
through 7 villages, meeting no resistence. He had, he told
Salisbury, come upon a new bush town of probably 2000-3000.
The inhabitants fled before he could catch them, and he burned
the town.
In one village Moor caught the headman and demanded that
he and two others serve as guides on pain of death for a false
lead. After the headman was killed in an attempt to flee, the
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other two served adequately. Moor was especially proud of
the destruction of the "embryo town." He described it for
Salisbury as having apartments for the King and Chiefs on the
model of Benin. "I am inclined to think" he wrote, "that the
destruction of this bush town will have as much effect on
the taking of Benin City, for the Bini little thought that
they could be tracked into the fastness of their bush, and
I anticipate that it will eventually result in the King and
Chief's coming in." 25
Moor was patient, confident of his tactics in burning
the last hope of the King, but the King remained illusive.
Moor decided to attend to other duties in the Protectorate.
He returned to Old Calabar and in the beginning of August
word reached him that the king had given himself up on Aug-
ust 3rd. It seems he could neither hide nor run. The 40 year
old King, Overami, whom Roth considered "stout" and "intelli-
26
gent", with about 800 followers, 20 wives and 10 chiefs, led
by messengers carrying a white flag, proceeded into town in
the wake of a reed band. The white men hid themselves when
they saw him enter. The King established himself in the house
of Chief Abeseke, who was now a member of the native council
established by the Resident. Two days later, Overami nerved
himself to enter the Palaver house with his boys and several
chiefs where the Acting Resident, Roupell received him.
Roupell had tactfully kept his own forces out of sight, although
they were prepared to act instantly should the need arise.
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The King, in his ceremonial dress, was, in Roth's words,
"covered with masses of strings of coral, inter-spersed with larger pieces, supposed to be worthmany pounds His head dress, which was in theshape of a Leghorn straw hat, was composed whollyof coral of excellent quality, meshed closelytogether, and must have weighed very heavily onhis head for it was constantly being temporarily
removed by an attendant. His wrists up to the
elbows were closely covered with coral bangles
so were his ankles. He only wore the usual white
cloth of a chief, and underneath, a pair of em-broidered and brocaded trousers; he had nothingin the way of a coat, but his breast was complete-ly hidden from view by the coral beads encirclinghis neck .
"
z 1 6
Roupell called out for Overami to make his submission. The
King, obviously agitated, consulted with his chiefs, while
a crowd of about 1000 people gathered. Chief Aro asked if
the King could not submit in private, but Roupell refused.
This scion of an ancient house was forced to make submission
in his accustomed manner. He knelt on the ground before the
young Roupell, and rubbed his forehead in the ground three
28times. The chiefs followed the example of their leader.
Roupell then explained to Overami that he was no longer King,
but a political prisioner. The Acting Resident could do no
more, as Moor was not expected back for another two weeks.
The King returned to Abeseke's house.
Inevitably, in keeping with Moor's views of Overami'
s
guilt, the British determined to try the fallen monarch. The
trial began on September 1st in the late afternoon. Consul
Moor called upon witnesses and cautioned them to speak the
truth. He told them that the trial was not about the fighting,
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because they could be proud of the courage with which they
defended their country, but that it was about the death of
Phillips. The trial, he told them, would be conducted
according to native law, and the 1st thing to settle was
who had ordered the massacre, King or chief.
^
The first witnesses, three chiefs' boys, attested that
although they knew the expedition was unarmed, their chiefs
instructed them to kill the white men. The chiefs thus named
were arrested and put in the guard room. When one of them
committed suicide by hanging himself his body was strung up
for a day in front of the King's compound.
On the 3rd day Moor summoned the chiefs as witnesses.
One after another they defended the innocence of the King.
According to Benin custom he never left his compound. Chiefs
came to him, he gave them orders, and then they did as they
thought fit. Overami, occupied with an annual festival at
the time of the Phillips expedition, was informed of the
movements of Phillips by his messengers. He stated explicitely
that no harm was to be done to them. Indeed he wanted to
talk with Phillips to see if he meant war. But the chiefs
ignored him. Testimony singled out as the leader one in
particular, Ologbosheri. Evidence also emerged that the
chiefs had feared, from the time of Nana's exile, that their
turn was coming. They were of course correct in their estimate
as the previous narrative attests, but the trial concerned
itself only with the massacre in its narrowest sense.
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On September 3rd the court met for a verdict. Moor
asked for a definition of native law and was told by the
chiefs that since seven white chiefs had been killed, seven
black chiefs must die. But the Consul General wished to
sentence only those who had discovered the white men to be
unarmed but attacked anyway. He found six chiefs guilty.
Of the six, two were already dead, one was a boy, one was
at large, and two were in his hands. Moor condemned them
to be shot the following morning. Ologbosheri, the insti-
gator, was at large. The Consul General suggested that the
other chiefs find him, or Britain would exact the full price
demanded by native law.
The executions took place the following day. Then it
was Moor's duty to explain to the king what would befall him
Moor told him, according to Roth, that he
"could no longer order the people about as before,
but ... .proper villages would be apportioned to him,
with servants, food, and all other necessaries as
for a big chief, for he would probably still be
the biggest chief, that position depending upon
his ability to govern. At the same time, the Con-
sul-General proposed to take the king and two or
three chiefs, with their wives and servants, on
a tour for a year or so to Calabar, Lagos and the
Yoruba country to see how other lands were govern-
ed. 1,30
Moor then told Overami to cons ider the matter and report to
the Palaver house on September 9th . How much Overami under-
stood of what was happening to him and of what his future
held one cannot know. Having fled once from his city and
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attempted, in a futile gesture, to build a new Benin in the
bush, he decided once more to deny the fait accompli which
had displaced him. He refused to appear on that day and Moor
sent a guard of fifty men to bring him to the Palaver house.
Frightened, Overami fled into the bush again. Moor then
threatened to burn every house and shoot every chief if
Overami did not appear by 4:00 P.M. Chief Ojumo finally
admitted that the king was hiding in his compound.
Roupell went with a few men to the compound. He went
in by the front door and sent the others around to the back.
When Overami heard noise in the front he rushed out by the
back, only to find himself in the arms of the others. He
was taken back to Moor who, on the spot, sentenced him to
be banished for life from Benin. 31
Moor had obviously decided that the king would be diffi-
cult to deal with in the native council, and his exile would
better serve imperial purposes. Overami, now very dejected,
attempted to bribe the Consul General with 200 puncheons of
oil and 500 ivory tusks. Moor refused. On the 15th in the
dead of night so as not to excite the people, the troops
brought Overami, bound and gagged, in a hammock, down to
Gwato
.
Readers of The Times in London learned on September 24th
that: "The King of Benin has been put on board the Protector
ate Yacht Ivy in order to be taken to Old Calabar." It was
from the Commander of the Ivy that the first word of the
70
massacre had come to London, following the rescue by the
Commander of that ship, of Boisragon and Locke. On the next
day, September 25*\ an exhibit of bronzes from Benin opened in
the Assyrian basement of the British Museum.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE BRONZES
The show in the Assyrian basement of the British Museum
in September 1897 contained about three hundred bronze plaques.
The papers thanked Lord Salisbury and Consul-General Moor for
making the exhibit possible. They failed to credit Admiral
Harry Rawson, though he was as responsible as Salisbury and
Moor
.
When the Admiral's flying column had entered the city of
Benin on the afternoon of the 18 th they had proceeded down the
broad streets directly to the King's compound. The compound
was huge, several acres in size, and with many buildings. Amid
the debrisof bodies, blood, dirt and signs of hasty departure
the men saw metal and ivory objects. The imperial forces immed-
iately organized a search and in one of the many buildings they
found hundreds of plaques together, half buried and covered with
dried blood. Rawson and Moor, realizing that the deserted city
was full of these objects, took council. Moor thought them
hideous,"'" tangible proof of the evils of superstition, but
2Rawson thought they might have some historical interest.
3Rawson cabled to the Foreign Office announcing the find, and
then put his mind to other matters. He gave Moor charge of
everything of value in the city. The Consul-General ordered
all objects brought to one place, and ordered his troops not to
loot. Then he posted a guard over the central area and, in agre
ment with Rawson, allowed trophies to all officers involved in
the expedition. The Admiral picked out what he wanted for him-
self and chose a large carved tusk for a gift to the Admiralty
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Office and a suitable trophy was also chosen for the Queen.
Moor, and then all the other officers present gathered trophies
for themselves. What remained they packed up. The control
Moor exercised over looting outside the King's compound de-
pended upon the integrity of the individuals involved. Since
only the officers received tangible rewards, many of the smalle
bronze pieces may have found their way into the pockets of the
first sailors or marines to lay eyes upon them, and then gone
to England unobserved in seachest or duffel bag. Since each
house had an altar of some kind, and the compound included not
only the King's but the large compounds of the chief and the
Queen Mother, the pickings would be easy.
Rawson thought that the British Museum might be interest-
ed in what had been officially gathered. He did not record
whether his men transported these spoils with them when they
left on the 22nd, or whether Moor disposed of them from Benin.
But on the 28 th of February the district commissioner in Sapele
wrote to the Crown Agents in London, announcing the sending of
two bronze plaques, with a request for them to be valued in
England. The plaques probably went on the hospital ship
Malacca
,
which left for England on March 5th . On the 24th they
reached the Crown Agents where Mr. E. E. Blake took charge of
them. He wrote the British Museum asking for someone to come
over and give an opinion. Mr. Charles Read, who had served
the Museum's Department of British and Medieval Antiquities
and Ethnography since 1880, and had headed it since 1896, came
to look at the bronzes. He was not an African expert and he re
turned to the museum to do his homework. He soon found, poss-
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ibly to his surprise, a large body of literature on Benin at
least in its relation to Europe. While he studied, Blake, still
with the Crown Agents, cabled Moor to send home as many more
pieces as he could. Read had promised an official report. On
April 2nd Maude Thompson of the Museum staff informed Blake
that Read, having examined the bronzes, had concluded that they
were of native manufacture, without, as he put it, "any admix-
ture of European or other civilized art." Read felt that since
that was the case the pieces would not shed much light on the
history of the city. Nevertheless, from the point of view of
the evolution of art, he would like more pieces for the museum.
He didn't suppose the pieces to be of much value financially. 7
At about the same time the Illustrated London News received
drawings from H
.
C. Seppings-Wright
, the artist who had arrived
in the city of Benin in the wake of the conquering force. At
the end of March the paper ran a large supplement, complete
with drawings by Seppings-Wright, on Benin. The author of the
article, possibly Seppings-Wright, who had arrived after the
loot had been divided up or packed away, lamented that the fire
had raged through the city, "spoiling all the valuable ivory
tusks and other curios which had been stored in the center of
gthe palaver house." Apparently he was completely unaware of
the existence of the official booty. In a follow-up article
on April 10th
,
entitled "Spoils from Benin", the author again
expressed distress at the loss of objects which would have
been of great antiquarian interest, "relics of a civilization
which dates back far beyond the Portuguese colonization of three
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centries ago, and probably owes much to Egyptian influence » 9
Seppings-Wright, if he were the author, may have picked up
some gossip in the camp from among the more sensitive officers.
The origin of these pieces must have stirred speculation from
the first. The author believed, however, that Mr. W. J. Hider,
a sailor, who had stored his collection in a building with a
brass roof possessed the only objects to survive the flames.
When he returned to England Hider immediately sold his objects
to Mr.Horniman for his free ethnographic museum at Forest Hill.
The paper noted that the collection contained two hand bells
"rung to announce a human sacrifice." 10
While the press published its limited information, official
interest in the bronzes continued, although no one ever explain-
ed how the pieces survived the flames and were removed from
Benin. After Read had given his opinion to the Crown Agents
and Moor had been notified, the two plaques sat in Blake's offic
On the 14th of April he wrote to the Consul-General asking him
what to do next. Should Blake send them to the Museum, or to
the Foreign Office? Moor apparently replied that they now be-
longed to the Foreign Office and should go there. Accordingly,
Blake announced to the Foreign Office on the 13th of May that
he was sending them two bronze plaques from Benin. 11 Fraser
of the Chief Clerk's Department at the Foreign Office scribbled
on Blake's note "....await the arrival of the other bronzes and
then see if the British Museum or South Kensington will buy." 12
Someone else along the line of command changed the order, scribb
ling underneath, "They belong to us. Please ask Crown Agents to
13send them over."
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The two bronze plaques thus reached the Foreign Office
where they remained, since no one took personal charge of the
loot. On June 30th the Crown Agents informed the Foreign Office
that three "very bulky" casks containing bronzes from Benin
had arrived and lay in the Quadrangle near the entrance to the
Colonial Office. The agents requested instructions from the
Foreign Secretary as to their disposal "as we have no instruct-
ions as to the wishes of the Commissioner." 14 At this point
someone informed Clement Hill of the situation and Hill requested
further background information. Clerk Fraser wrote, in his own
hand
,
"The history of these bronzes is to the best of
my recollection as follows. Some time ago when I
went to see Mr. Blake he showed me the two bronzes
which are at present in our room which had just
been sent here by Moor from Benin who had said
there were a lot more which it was proposed to
sell that the market value of such things is very
little and must now be less than ever in consequence
of the large number that must have been brought home
by officers—not to mention that to throw punch-
eons full on the market at once would bring it down
to zero .
"
Hill commented on the memo:
"If the market value has gone down it seems hardly
worth while to have brought them over. Perhaps we
had better tell treasury in the first instance, as
they may claim the bronzes as part payment of the
Benin expenses."
To inform the treasury, however, raised a question of pol-
icy, for treasury interference might limit, as Fraser observed,
the decision-making power of the Secretary of State with regard
to revenue raised in the Protectorate. Imperial expenses differ-
ed from Protectorate Revenue. Fraser in his response to Hill
wrote that selling puncheons of curios to offset the expenses
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of the expedition "is somewhat of a new departure as regards
the Niger Coast Protectorate where being a self-supporting
institution the Secretary of State, i.e., the Foreign Secretary,
represents the Lords of the Treasury in matters of finance."
The Foreign Secretary could himself decide on the sale of the
bronzes without consulting the treasury, " a course which
might be highly inconvenient at some later date." Hill, in
turn, resenting the implied aspersion upon his intelligence,
commented
:
"This is hardly put correctly. My idea was that
before disposing of the contents of the casks we
should ask Treasury whether they had any wishes
or views as to the best method. They will cer-
tainly pay, either directly or through the Admiral-
ty, the greater part of the cost of the expedition,
and may expect a voice in the disposal of the plun-
der. Say the loot had mounted up to a million ster-
ling, would you have given it all to the Protector-
ate without consulting Treasury?"
Fraser replied on July 14th :
"What I feel is that the Treasury is in no better
position than the Secretary of State to decide
what is the best method of disposing of these
curios and that if we consult them on what is
practically a money point we shall be introducing
a new system which it will be subsequently difficult
to stop. If the Treasury were going to pay the
whole of the expedition expenses they might have
some interest in the disposal of the plunder which
would (help) to reduce those expenses but as, in
accordance with settled policy in these cases, they
will only demand a contribution from the Protector-
ate and will fall under the general direction of
the Secretary of State. My suggestion is that after
inviting the inspection of' the British Museum and
perhaps S. Kensington any of the curios not required
might be sold under the direction of the Crown
Agents, and the proceeds of the sale credited to
the funds of the Protectorate."
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Hill yielded the point on the L7«>, "I have no objection. My
only wish was the the Treasury should not be able to blame us—
Proceed as Mr. Fraser suggests."
On that same day, a note came to the Foreign Office from
the Crown Agents marked PRESSING. It announced the arrival of
three more casks and asked for orders as to their disposal. 15
Hill endorsed the message: "We are waiting a decision on theirs
of June 30th as to how to proceed", and then composed a memo-
randum to acquaint Salisbury with the facts. It related that
six casks of bronzes had now been sent to England by Consul
General Moor:
"The question arises whether they should be
sold by public auction, the British Museum being
given the chance of selecting what it wants, and
the proceeds paid into the Protectorate accounts,
or whether the treasury should be consulted as to
their disposal. The treasury has nothing to do
with the funds of the Protectorate but it is poss-
ible that it may claim the curios as loot, if the
Imperial Government pay the expenses of the Benin
Expedition without asking for a Protectorate con-
tribution. The chief Clerk's Department advocate
sale without consulting treasury."
Hill clearly did not want to be responsible for a decision which
might later prove sticky. Salisbury scribbled in "Yes" and
1
6
added an "S" in red. The matter interested him very little.
The six casks now went over to the British Museum where
they were cleaned, analyzed as to metallic content, and pre-
pared for exhibit. The Foreign Office deemed them saleable
objects, similar to the gold cups from Ashanti which had been
melted down to pay military expenses. They constituted
80
official booty, to be used to help in future development of
the Protectorate.
Rawson had originally claimed 1000 pieces as official
booty. 17 Only three hundred pieces graced the museum. Seven
hundred remained unaccounted for. Furthermore a vast amount
of bric-a-brac and smaller objects had never been officially
declared. Since Admiral Rawson had originally supposed the
objects of possible historical interest, he and Moor no doubt
agreed that a representative selection rather than the whole
lot would be sufficient to send to England. Accordingly they
sold off the excess. Moor later commented: "The greater part
of the property of value found was disposed of locally as oppor
tunity offered, or shipped home
. . . . I think speaking from memory
that about L1200 or L1500 was realized locally and credited tc
18Protectorate funds." He did not name or describe the local
buyers
.
German companies along the coast of West Africa controlled
19
the art market companies at this time. ' In whatever the way
the pieces got from Benin to the coast, many of them fell into
the hands of German dealers. Several pieces from Benin were
presented to a German Anthropological Association meeting in
20
Luebeck in August, 1897. Many more pieces also began to
show up in London at art dealers and auctioneers' houses. A
21
large auction held at Hale's and Son, London, came to the
attention of a young German anthropologist, Frederick Von
Luschan. He arrived in the knick of time to buy several items
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for the Berlin museum. The objects so impressed him that he
informed himself of the events surrounding their arrival in
England, and on a hunch, cabled the German Consulate in Lagos,
to buy up all available antiquities from Benin, regardless of
22price. Consul Edward Schmidt followed his advice and pur-
chased a large number of pieces then available in Lagos. An-
other German named Bey put together an even larger collection
of 176 pieces from the coast market.
Individual British collectors also acquired privately
many of the antiquities. Probably at the Hale's and smaller
auctions General Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers picked up some examples
23
of work from Benin. Pitt-Rivers, a wealthy colonial official
and ethnologist, had collected artifacts from the colonies for
decades. A friend of the famed anthropologist Edward Tylor,
the General exhibited his collection in his own museum in Ox-
ford. Pitt-Rivers constantly watched for objects which would
fill out his collections, and that summer of 1897 must have
been a fruitful time. The British Museum by contrast, always
short of funds, apparently could buy only one ivory tusk at
-i 24the sales.
When the exhibit of plaques opened at the Museum on Sept-
ember 25th , an article in The Times commented that they would
be of great value in helping to assign other objects from
Africa to their proper area. In themselves, the author noted,
"both by the novelty of the subjects and the technical perfect-
ion of the work, (they) are surprizing evidence of the skill
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of the Benin native in the casting of metal.- 25 The reporter
only echoed the opinion of experts for, as Charles Read wrote
shortly after: "....at the first sight of these remarkable
works of art we were at once astounded at such an unexpected
find, and puzzeled to account for so highly developed an art
among a race so entirely barbarous as were the Bini 1,26
It shocked the experts to discover that the process by which
the bronzes had been cast was the same as that which had pro-
duced "the finest bronzes of the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
2 7turies in Europe » The Times reporter still doubted
whether the bronzes should be called art, but that they were
well cast he could not deny. He referred to the attempts by
the experts to discover their origin and, echoing Read, lament-
ed :
"....there was a faint hope among those who thought
of possibilities, that among the loot from Benin
might be found some traces of the more ancient
civilizations of Northern Africa, drifted down among the
unheeding negroes through the trade routes which
have served from time immemorial as the avenues
by which the great natural riches of Central Africa
reached the Medite rranean. " 2
8
To think the natives of Benin had made the pieces on their own
was sofar impossible:
"....whether they are the work of negroes or of some
wandering tribe of alien craftsmen, with whom cast-
ing was a hereditary occupation, they are certainly
the most interesting works of art which have ever
left the western shores of the Dark Continent."^"
Read's immediate reaction upon seeing the pieces had been
to suppose Binis had made them. But as he read the early history
of Benin he changed his mind. That Benin was"one of the first
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important negro kingdoms which became known to Europeans" 30
did not sufficiently explain to him how the bronzes had been
made. He believed that the kingdom had been oriented to the
north, and thus open to possible influence from the Mediterr-
anean. "Who can say", he wrote, "what shreds and patches of
Mediterranean civilization may not have drifted with the drift-
ing people far into the darkness of the interior?" 31 The cire
perdue, or lost wax process by which the casting was done was
so intricate that only those long acquainted with casting could
have used it. Read commented: " we thus find the Benin
savages using with familiarity and success a complicated method
which satisfied the fastidious eye of the best artists of the
32Italian Renaissance."* How shocking to the cultural evolution
ist! Read valued the pieces chiefly because they constituted
a collection, "so large and various as to furnish a complete
history of the dress, weapons, and ceremonies of the Benin
• 33
natives .
"
Officials at the museum were now eager to make sure that
they could keep permanently the bronzes presently on exhibit.
E. Maude Thompson wrote a personal letter to Salisbury on
December 28th
,
noting that the "remarkable collection" had
excited interest from the general public as well as the
scientific community. "This interest" he said
"is caused by the unusual and unexpected style of
the art, and by the rarity of objects of any kind
from the city of Benin. The collection now de-
posited here shows that at some former time there
was in Benin a highly developed art of modelling
and casting of metal though the decline of the king-
I
dom during the last hundred years would appear to
have led to the abandonment of such crafts. The
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con-
tablets or panels of bronze number about three hun-dred, and although there are, strictly speaking
no duplicates among them, yet in several instancesthe same subject is repeated with slight variations." 34
He further commented that he understood the show was to
tinue until January and that in the meantime he was to choose
those which he wanted for the Museum's permanent collection,
returning the others to the Crown Agents "to be sold for the
benefit of the Niger Coast Protectorate". He informed the
Prime Minister that he had made his selection and that it
included two hundred plaques. "The trustees consider these
objects of sufficient interest", he informed Salisbury, "to
make them the subject of an official publication to be issued
shortly in which the property of the Museum will be figured.
For this reason it is important to have your Lordship's con-
firmation of the understanding above mentioned, in order that
the publication may be proceeded with, and I have therefore to
ask if your Lordship will be pleased to authorize the Trustees
to retain the desired selection."
Francis Bertie replied for Salisbury that the Foreign
35Office had no objection. It would, however, like to know
when the remainder of the plaques would be returned to the
Crown Agents, and would also like to have six copies of the
proposed publication. Thompson, in turn, assured Bertie that
six copies of the book would be sent, and that the panels would
36be sent to the Crown Agents on or about the 25th of January.
On February 8 th the Crown Agents informed the Foreign Office that
they had delivered the 104 expected bronze plaques. What
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should they do with them? 37 "Mr. C. H. Read," one of the
Crown Agents said, "of the British Museum has suggested that
private collectors and foreign museums should be allowed to
purchase some of these bronzes and has offered to advise as
to the prices which should be required in each case. And
with the Secretary of State's approval we propose to dispose
of the bronzes accordingly." The Secretary of State approved.
Pricing of the objects and arranging the sale took some time.
At the end of April, Blake from the Crown Agents wrote again
to the Foreign Office announcing the arrival of eleven more
bronzes with no instructions as to their disposal. 3 ^ Read
had looked at the new arrivals and selected two. The remain-
ing nine, Blake reported, "we would propose to dispose of in
the manner authorized in your letter of the 22 February."
Meanwhile, Ralph Moor now back in London, had gone to the
Foreign Office apparently to bestow gifts of Benin trophies
upon various officials who had been involved in planning the
punitive expedition. Someone had scribbled a note on the back
of Blake's letter questioning Moor's right to distribute the
loot as gifts. Then he crossed it out, adding "The question
of the Benin bronzes presented by Sir R. Moor to members of
the African Dept. ought not to be discussed on the back of a
letter from the Crown Agents respecting other bronzes intended
for account of the government. I regret that I was induced to
O Q
make a minute on the subject " He had mistakenly assumed
that all objects from Benin were to be handled as the 300 bronze
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plaques had been. "If Sir R. Moor',' he further noted, "made
a present to certain members of the Foreign Office of bronzes
which personally belonged to him, I do not see that any decision
is required. If that is not so", he continued, "or if there is
any doubt on the subject, there should be a minute stating the
circumstances and Sir R. Moor's opinion as to his right of
property and presentation, in order that Lord Salisbury's
decision may be obtained." He concluded "I do not know what
Sir R. Moor's 'share of the loot' means exactly—but it does
not sound as if it could be quoted to the Auditor General of
the House of Commons."
.
The whole question of the rights of looting had not hitherto
been examined. The fortuitous appearance of Ralph Moor giving
out trophies coinciding with the disposal of the declared
official booty, had raised the question. A search was ordered
by the Foreign Office to see just what the regulations regard-
ing looting were. On May 7th a lawyer at the Foreign Office,
Mr. Clarke, reported on his findings.^
"The Naval Prize Regulations (Navy List - p. 769)
which, at least so far as the Naval Brigade was
concerned, should properly be applicable to the
Benin Expedition do not unfortunately say any-
thing about captures by land and have therefore
no bearing on the matter.
Army Prize forms the subject of a voluminous
Blue Book issued in 1864 which contains amongst
other matter a scale of the various amounts of
prize money receivable by officers and men of
all ranks from a commander in chief to a bugler.
The regulations however, to be found there, in-
cluding a Treasury Minute, seem to contemplate
only operations on a large scale; and something
more germane to the matter in hand may perhaps
be found in a remark in a letter from the Sec-
retary to Chelsea Hospital by whom all questions
of prize, etc., are dealt with to the effect
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that "sometimes after the capture of small quan-
tities of booty the General Officer commanding
takes on himself to distribute it on the spot,
a practice which is irregular but not inconven-
ient. "
The foregoing remarks show however beyond
all question that the principle of prize or booty
has been recognized for years; and that there need
be no fear lest, supposing the matter brought be-
fore the House of Commons or the Auditor General,
either of these authorities should find subject
for remark in the fact of Sir R. Moor having had
a share of the booty taken at the capture of Benin."
Not content with Mr. Clarke's admirable summation of British
policy in the matter, the Foreign Office requested Sir Ralph,
no doubt to his great embarrassment, to submit a memorandum
regarding the bronzes in order to close the issue. Moor did
41
so on June 9, 1898. He told of the arrival of the troops
into the city, of Rawson's decision to place him in charge of
all objects of value found in the city, and of his decision
to forbid looting. He went on to describe how the objects
were collected together in one place, the officers choosing
each a trophy, and of the subsequent local sales. "I may
mention," he commented, "that the stories of Benin City's
stores of ivory and wealth were found to be of the fairy des-
cription, and such new ivory as the King possessed was I found
in September last, got away by the Natives and never recovered
and I did not think it wise to attempt its recovery." Moor
mentioned that eight or nine bronzes had been given to the
African Department on the same principle that trophies had
been distributed to those officers actively involved. He
concluded, "I may mention that Her Majesty the Queen was
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graciously pleased to accept some trophies of the operations
sent through Lord Salisbury—and I believe that His Royal
Highness the Prince of Wales and the First Lord of the Admiralty
also accepted trophies sent by Rear Admiral Sir H. H. Rawson."
Clement Hill commented dryly, "quite satisfactory".^ 2
The Crown Agents went ahead with the sale of the remain-
ing bronzes. Charles Read informed Von Luschan of the event
and the German acquired thirty-two plaques for the Berlin
Museum, others going to a private German collector, Dr. Hans
Meyer, for the Leipzig Museum. General Pitt-Rivers heard
of the sale and was allowed to choose before the general pub-
lic. Later, in commenting on his own collection of more than
300 pieces from Benin/ Pitt-Rivers criticized government policy.
They had as usual taken no anthropological authority along on
the expedition who could have given a clue as to the use of the
objects after seeing them in place.^ The natives had proven
worthless as suppliers of information. H. Ling Roth, brother
to Dr. Felix Roth, and himself an anthropologist, also criticiz-
ed British policy. While he complimented Pitt-Rivers on his
speed in buying up what he could, he castigated the government
for letting so many pieces slip out of the country into the
hands of the Germans. Charles Read, he said, had been hampered
by "want of proper pecuniary support", as a result:
"Not only was the national institution thus de-
prived of its lawful acquisitions, but at the same
time another government department sold for a few
hundred pounds a large number of castings which
had cost thousands to obtain, as well as much
blood of our countrymen
.
,,z+ 5
The Germans, by contrast, had demonstrated alertness.
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"For many years", Roth exclaimed, "the Germanshave foreseen that the study of native races and
their development, a study known to us under the
awkward name of Anthropology, is essential to
every civilized community which trades with, or
is called upon to govern native communities,
and with their characteristic throughness they
have, become leaders in a branch of science in
which the Americans alone have been able to
equal them. . . . "4-6
German ethnologists could obtain money from their government,
and when that ran out, from their Kaiser, and when that was
finished, from German industry. So could the Americans. By
contrast, the British did not even try to raise money. Clear-
ly, in Roth's mind, the British lagged behind. He felt the
study of native races essential in order to govern them well,
and to avoid bloodshed. Furthermore, he believed they were
disappearing all to rapidly, if not literally as the Tasman-
ians had done. "....The West African will never be wiped off
the face of the earth", he concluded, "but intercourse with
the white man alters his beliefs, ideas, customs, and tech-
nology, and proper records of these should be made before we
destroy them."^ Alas, his sensitivity came too late to help
Benin.
By the end of 1898 the cognoscenti knew a fair amount
about Benin. But the king lived in exile in Old Calabar; the
art of centuries had been dispersed across Europe; and the
kingdom was no longer independant.
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